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The competition for available land space in California's coastal
zone is intense.- Even though the coastal zone comprises a mere 8
percent of the state's total land mass, it already contains 90 percent of
the state's population.2 Furthermore, the coastal population will in-
crease by another 40 percent within the next 10 years.3 Indeed, it has
been estimated that if land continues to be absorbed at the present rate
in the San Francisco Bay Area and along the southern coast, all ha-
bitable land in those two areas will be completely occupied by 1990.4
In view of this widespread and rapid growth, one might reason-
ably expect to find a comprehensive plan regulating development of the
coastal zone. Unfortunately, such a plan does not yet exist. Until very
recently the only principle regulating development has been expedi-
ency, with very little concern for the future.5 As a result, California's
valuable shoreline has all too often been the victim of "helter-skelter
development."
Often with the encouragement of local governments seeking ad-
ditional tax revenues, developers have been draining, dredging and
filling coastal lands at a slow but inexorable rate with the ecological con-
sequences becoming apparent only after severe permanent damage has
been inflicted.7 The estuaries, areas of inestimable ecological signifi-
cance,8 have been destroyed at an alarming rate.9 Shoreline marshes,
so important for wildlife conservation,'0 have encountered a similar
1. CommrEE ON OCEAN RESOURCES, RESOURCES AoENcY OF CAr.oRNA,
CALIoRNUI AND Tm OCEAN 81 (1966).
2. CAL FORNA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCES
& TBE INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON OCEAN RESOURCES, CA iuoRNiA's COASTAL ZONE
(unpaginated summary 1968).
3. CoMMISSION ON OCEAN RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 105.
4. CALoIORNIA ADVISORY COMMISSlON ON MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCES,
supra note 2.
5. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, PLANNING AND
PUBLIC WORKS, TIDE AND SUBMERGED LANDS 151 (1964).
6. HOUSE COMMAITIE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPBRATIONS, PROTECTNG AMERICA'S
ESTUARmS: TnE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AND DELTA, H.R. REP. No. 1433, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1970).
7. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 177 (1970).
8. See, e.g., id. at 176.
9. In the short period between 1947 and 1967 California lost 67 percent of its
estuarine habitat. Hearings on the Estuarine Areas Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967).
10. See, e.g., H. HARvE, REPORT TO THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND
[7591
fate." As summed up in one study, there are now coastal areas in the
state that are faced with a genuine "environmental crisis.' 1
2
While there may be reason for apprehension about the nation's abil-
ity to correct its past land abuses,13 it is possible to be more optimistic
about eventually halting the deleterious over-development that has
plagued the state's coastal zone. A basis for reform already exists in
the state, for when California was ceded to the United States by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 14 all of the state's tidelands1" automati-
cally became the subject of a public trust.' 6 As a result, there is now
a firmly established judicial precedent for protecting the "public inter-
est" in those lands.
California courts have traditionally limited utilization of the trust
to the promotion of commerce, the fisheries and navigation.' 7  Com-
mercial exploitation of the coastal zone, however, has proceeded to a
point that no longer permits such a shortsighted view. The "public in-
terest" is a concept sufficiently flexible to expand in a manner consistent
with contemporary concern for environmental quality, and judicial in-
terpretation of the trust should reflect this fact. Not only is there noth-
ing to preclude broadening the scope of the public interest to include
environmental considerations, but it seems quite clear that this must be
accomplished if the trust is to have any relevance to the present needs
DEVELOPMENT COMM'N: SOME ECOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY 20
(1966).
11. Of the original three and one-half million acres of shoreline marsh in the
state, less than a half-million acres remain. 1 CALIFORNIA FISH AND GAiE COMM'N,
CALIFORNIA FISH AND WILDLIFE PLAN 54 (1966).
12. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 6.
13. "Misuse of the land is now one of the most serious and difficult challenges
to environmental quality, because it is the most out of hand and irreversible."
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 7, at 165.
14. Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1848), T.S. No. 207.
15. In California "tideland" has been defined as the land that is "covered and
uncovered by the daily flux and reflux of the tides." City of Oakland v. Oakland
Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 182, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897). On this subject two
points require mention: first, there is a conflict between state and federal decisions
defining landward boundaries of the tidelands. State decisions hold that the landward
boundary is the ordinary high water mark set by the neap tides (the tides midway
between spring tides and, consequently, least in height). Federal decisions, on the
other hand, fix the landward boundary a little higher on the shore at an imaginary line
determined by averaging the height for the tides over the scientifically established period
of 18.6 years. See People v. William Kent Estate Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 159-61,
51 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218-19 (1966). Second, it should be noted that "tidelands" as
used in connection with the tideland trust includes submerged lands as well as those
lands covered and uncovered by the daily flux of the tides. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L. R.R.
v. Hamilton, 161 Cal. 610, 614, 119 P. 1073, 1074 (1911).
16. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596, 138 P. 79, 87 (1913).
17. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 37 (1970).
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of the state.' 8
I. Historical Origins of the Tideland Trust
The tideland trust is not a contemporary legal development, and its
effective use requires some understanding of its Roman origins, its modi-
fication under English law and its early treatment by American courts.' 9
Only by examining the evolution of the trust doctrine does it become
apparent that the trust has neither a life of its own nor any intrinsic con-
tent.20 Rather, it has always been the product of the socio-historic con-
text in which it has found articulation.
Under Roman law the public's right to use the seashore was almost
unrestricted. This is perhaps best illustrated by a passage from Justini-
an's Institutes which declared that:
The public use of the seashore, as of the sea itself, is part of the
law of nations; consequently everyone is free to build a cottage
upon it for purposes of retreat, as well as to dry his nets and
haul them up from the sea. But they cannot be said to belong
to anyone as private property .... 21
With the decline of the Roman Empire, the influence exerted by
Roman institutions lessened and the strength of indigenous customs cor-
respondingly increased. In the early days of post-Roman England, the
vitality of the public's earlier interest in the tidelands yielded to the
stresses of absolute kingly power which rose to fill the vacuum created
by the waning of imperial protection. Until the Magna Charta was
signed in 1215, the prerogatives of the prestigious Anglo-Saxon and
Norman rulers went largely unchallenged. During this period public
ownership of the tidelands entered a difficult stage, with English rulers
coming to see themselves as possessing definite private interests in those
lands which they could, and did, alienate freely to deserving subjects. 22
Despite the pressures exerted by these early sovereigns, the con-
cept of a public interest in the tidelands remained viable and public
rights of "egress and regress for fishing, trading and other uses" were
preserved.23 As Lord Hale pointed out in his now classic De Jure Marls
in 1786,24 even though the king was able to forge extensive inroads into
18. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 474 (1970).
19. For an extensive historical treatment of this subject, see Comment, The Pub-
lic Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J
762 (1970).
20. See Sax, supra note 18, at 521.
21. INSTrrTES 2.1.5.
22. For an extensively documented study of royal conveyancing of tidelands
before the Magna Charta, see S. MooRE, A HISTORY OF THE FoRESHoRE AN THE LAW
RELATING THERETO ch. 1 (1888).
23. R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF
THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM 106 (2d ed. 1875).
24. Reprinted in S. MOORE, supra note 22, at 370-413.
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the public tideland rights by making private grants, the rights of private
grantees (]us privatum) were always viewed as subservient to the rights
of the public (us publicum).5
This is not to say that Parliament was inactive. To the contrary,
Parliament took a special interest in the public's use of the shoreline.
Public rights were "modified, promoted, or restrained by the common
law, and by numerous acts of parliament relating to the fisheries,
the revenues and the public safety ... 26 Thus, regulating the tide-
lands was viewed as a legitimate exercise of the police power.
While the concept of a public interest in the tidelands was per-
petuated it also remained elusive. Often the public right was described
in very broad terms, as in Bagott v. Orr,27 where the court referred to it
as "the right of the subject to use the shore of the sea in every way in
which it could be serviceable to him." '28 At other times it was implied
that perhaps that interest might even defy description; in Blundell v.
Catterall2" the court noted that:
[t]he passages cited from Lord Hale's treatise, De Jure Mars
. . . in which it is laid down, "that the jus privatum that is ac-
quired to the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not
prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers or arms of
the sea are affected for public use;" leave the question un-
touched; because the question in this case is, what the jus pub-
licum is: and that they do not define.30
The concept that public rights existed in the tidelands was also in-
corporated into early American law. With the vesting of sovereignty in
the people, additional stress was placed on the unrestricted right of the
public. The nature of this right was stated quite clearly in Martin v.
Waddell,31 an early United States Supreme Court decision on the subject
which noted that:
When the Revolution took place, the people of each state be-
came themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the abso-
lute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them
for their own common use. .... 32
Perhaps the most celebrated American tidelands trust decision,
squarely within the Martin v. Waddel tradition, is that of Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.33 The dispute in that case centered around the
25. d.at 404-05.
26. R. HALL, supra note 23, at 108.
27. 126 Eng. Rep. 1391 (C.P. 1801).
28. Id. at 1394.
29. 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821).
30. Id. at 1204. The constantly changing nature of the jus publicum is ex-
plored in section VI infra.
31. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
32. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
33. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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validity of a deed by which the state of Illinois purported to convey to
the defendant railroad scandalously large holdings of land along Chi-
cago's lake front.34 The blatant disregard for the public, evidenced by
the size of the transaction, was brought to the attention of the United
States Supreme Court and the grant was held to be invalid.
The importance of this "lodestar"' 5 of American public trust law
is the reasoning used by the court in reaching its conclusion. The court
held that because the lands conveyed were tidelands, they were neces-
sarily trust lands;36 therefore, the conveyance could only be valid if it
in some way promoted the public interest in commerce, the fisheries or
navigation.17 Because the lands conveyed were so extensive, the court
held that the only effect the grant could have would be to prejudice the
public's rights,3 and that the entire conveyance was therefore invalid.
39
H. Development of the Trust in California
A. The Trust and the California Legislature
The phenomenon of private interests seeking to exploit tidelands
for their own pecuniary gain, dealt with in Illinois Central, is not foreign
to California's past. Recently it was noted that in California "existing
State policy governing state-owned lands emphasizes disposal, rather
than creative management of these lands for a variety of uses in the pub-
lic interest. ' 40  Unfortunately, in the case of the state's tidelands, this
policy was early established with, thousands of acres being sold into
private hands in the first few decades of the state's existence.41 Abuses
and injustices in connection with tlose early grants seem to have been
rampant.42 Indeed, when the constitutional convention met in 1878,
34. The grant covered over a thousand acres of tideland located in the heart of
Chicago's harbor. It was more than three times the size of the outer harbor, which it
included along with adjacent lands suitable for future harbor facilities. The grant was as
large as the then-existing merchandise docks along the Thames at London; it was
larger than Liverpool's dock and basin area and twice the size of the port of Mar-
seilles. Id. at 454.
35. See Sax, supra note 18, at 489-91, where the author maintains that the
significance of the Illinois Central holding is its illustration of the principle that
"when a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general pub-
lic, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct
which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties." Id. at 490.
36. 146 U.S. at 452.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 453.
39. Id. at 463-64.
40. CALIFORNiA FISH AND GAME COMm'N, supra note 11, at 29.
41. M. ScoTr, THE FuTPE o SAN FRANcIsco BAY 3 (1963).
42. In Los Angeles County the Central Pacific Railroad had bought all the tide-
land frontage along the San Pedro harbor and was requiring all wharf construction to
be cleared through its offices. In the San Francisco Bay Area it was not uncommon
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an intense debate ensued over the means of correcting such abuses, and
delegate N.G. Wyatt told those assembled that:
If there is any one abuse greater than another that I think the
people of the State of California have suffered at the hands of
their lawmaking power, it is the abuse that they have received
in the granting out and disposition of the lands belonging to the
State.
43
To Wyatt's remarks, delegate Hager added:
This question of tidelands has been before the Legislature again
and again. As we all know, a great many abuses have grown
out of the management and sale of tidelands in this state. .... 44
Finally, the delegates ratified article XV, sections 2 and 3.45 Sec-
tion 2 is fairly broad in scope and guarantees access to all navigable
water in the state for any public purpose. Section 3 prohibits the aliena-
tion of any tidelands from the trust when they are located within 2 miles
of "any incorporated city, city and county, or town." These enactments
have erroneously been credited with saving the tidelands from complete
capture by private interests;4" in fact, they went no further than prior
for unscrupulous speculators to purchase tideland lots and then force owners of abutting
dry lands to pay extortionate prices for mud flats in order to regain their bay access.
Id. at 9.
43. 2 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1038 (1880).
44. 3 id. at 1480.
45. Section 2 provides:
"People Shall Always Have Access to Navigable Waters
Sec. 2. No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the
frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this
State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is re-
quired for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such
water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construc-
tion to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be al-
ways attainable for the people thereof."
Section 3 provides:
"Tidelands Not to Pass Into Private Hands
Sec. 3. All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, city and county,
or town in this State, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet
used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private per-
sons, partnerships, or corporations."
In 1962, § 3 was amended to include the following addition:
"Provided, however, that any such tidelands, reserved to the State solely for street
purposes, which the Legislature finds and declares are not used for navigation purposes
and are not necessary for such purposes may be sold to any town, city, county, city
and county, municipal corporations, private persons, partnerships or corporations subject
to such conditions as the Legislature determines are necessary to be imposed in connec-
tion with any such sales in order to protect the public interest."
46. SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, OWNERSHIP:
A REPORT 22 (1968).
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statutes had gone.4r They did have the one advantage, however, of
being difficult to change, and therefore constituted a long overdue rec-
ognition that the value of the state's tidelands entailed more than just
what they could bring on the open market. In 1909 the legislature fi-
nally passed a total ban on the further sale in fee simple of any
and all remaining tidelands.48
Nothing in present California law, however, precludes leases and
grants-in-trust of the tidelands. By these two means municipalities to
this day are allowed to receive tidelands on the condition that they de-
vote them to trust purposes; that is, the promotion of commerce, the
fisheries and navigation. Unfortunately, such grants and leases are
often extremely permissive.49 A recent grant,5" for example, specifi-
cally allows development of the land for power lines, convention cen-
ters, snackbars, hotels, motels and apartment buildings, to name just a
few of the authorized uses."' So far, such grants have not been invali-
dated by the courts; but, as opined by one writer, that is perhaps due to
the fact that no one has yet seen fit to challenge them.52
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Trust
California courts have always been receptive to the idea that the
public has certain inalienable rights in the state's tidelands; indeed, the
precedent established in Illinois Central has been cited and quoted with
approval in numerous California decisions.5" Until recently the leading
California decision on the tideland trust was People v. California Fish
47. See, e.g., San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R. v. Hamilton, 161 Cal. 610, 618-19,
119 P. 1073, 1076 (1911), citing Cal. Stat. 1869-1870, ch. 573, § 70, at 877-78.
48. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 7991.
49. E.g., Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 654, at 1258 & ch. 657, at 1258, which constitute a
grant to Oakland authorizing the city to make leases for "any and all purposes which
shall not interfere with navigation or commerce." Id. ch. 654, at 1255. A grant to Los
Angeles allows the city to make leases "for purposes consistent with the trust upon
which said lands are held by the State of California and with the requirements of
commerce or navigation at said harbor." Id. ch. 656, at 1256.
50. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1763, § 1, at 3767-70.
51. Sax, supra note 18, at 536-38 contends that in the last analysis these statutes
are not nearly as broad as they seem, because they often contain a general clause re-
quiring compliance with the trust. See note 49 supra.
52. See SAN FRANcIsco BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, supra
note 46, at 10, where it is noted that numerous uses authorized in grants affecting San
rancisco Bay have not yet been made the subject of court tests even though many of
them would appear to be questionable.
53. E.g., Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 206, 282 P.2d 481, 485
(1955); City of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal. 2d 254, 262, 188 P.2d 17, 22 (1947);
Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 48 P.2d 20, 25 (1935); Boone v. Kingsbury,
206 Cal. 148, 182-83, 273 P. 797, 812 (1928); People v. California Fish Co., 166
Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 82 (1913); Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 262,
90 P. 532, 535 (1907); City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160,
182-84, 50 P. 277, 285-86 (1897).
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Co.,54 which attempted to list systematically the terms of the trust.5"
The status of that decision has been preempted, however, by the recent
treatment found in City of Long Beach v. Mansell,56 in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court grappled with the problem of deciding when the
state can be estopped from asserting that certain tidelands being used
for non-trust purposes are still subject to the trust. In the process of
formulating Mansell the court, consolidated California Fish and the
cases decided subsequent to it. The principles announced in Mansell,
California Fish and other judicial decisions together with applicable
legislative enactments constitute a comprehensive list of the trust terms:
1. The tidelands of the state are subject to a public trust for the
people of the state.57 The purpose of that trust has traditionally been
delineated in terms of the promotion of commerce, the fisheries and
navigation.58
2. Administration of the trust is committed to the legislature, 59
which in turn has delegated management operations to the State Lands
Commission. "
3. The powers of the state as trustee are not expressed but are
commensurate with the duties of the trust. 1 This permits the state to
do whatever is necessary for the proper administration of the trust.62
4. Since 1909 the sale of any and all tidelands in the state has
been forbidden by statute.63  Attempted sales are void.64  Grants-in-
trust and leases, however, are permissible.65
5. In its administration of the trust, the state may properly find it
necessary or advisable to segregate certain tidelands from water access
and thereby render them useless for trust purposes.66 This may be
done, however, only when it will not lead to substantial impairment of
the public interest in the remaining lands and waters.67  If the state,
54. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
55. Id. at 596-99, 138 P. at 87-88.
56. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
57. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
59. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 n.17, 476 P.2d 423, 437
n.17, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 n.17 (1970); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576,
597, 138 P. 79, 87 (1913). See also City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 175 Cal. 575, 579,
166 P. 333, 336 (1917).
60. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 6301.
61. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 37 (1970).
62. Id. at 482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
63. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 7991.
64. 3 Cal. 3d at 482 n.18, 476 P.2d at 437 n.18, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37 n.18.
65. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
66. 3 Cal. 3d at 482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
67. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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through the legislature, determines that such lands are no longer useful
for trust purposes,68 the appropriate lands may be freed from the trust
and irrevocably alienated into absolute private ownership, provided
that article XV, section 3, does not apply.69 Whether such a determi-
nation is necessary prior to tideland disposal is an unsettled issue;70 the
legislature, however, appears to have assumed it to be necessary, or at
least highly desirable, judging from past statutes making tideland
grants.71
6. Where the legislature has made a determination that certain
tidelands are no longer useful for trust purposes and that those lands are
free from the trust, such determination will be conclusive on courts
called upon to review it unless there is evidence that the proposed legis-
lative action will impair the power of successive legislatures to adminis-
ter the trust in a manner consistent with its broad purposes. 72  Whether
legislative intent to terminate the trust is ineffective when there is evi-
dence that the physical condition of the land does not preclude enjoy-
ment of the public trust also appears to be an unsettled question.
73
7. In construing statutory determinations purporting to authorize
an abandonment of the public servitude, the courts will look for a clearly
expressed or necessarily implied legislative intention to that effect. Such
intent will not be implied if any other inference is reasonably possible;
and if any interpretation of the statute in question is reasonably possible
that would not involve a destruction of the public servitude or an inten-
tion to terminate it in violation of the trust, the courts will give the
statute such interpretation.74
8. Where tidelands are still subject to the trust, the trust may be
partially revoked as to those lands to allow income derived from the
extraction of minerals imbedded in the lands to be used for purposes
outside the trust so long as no substantial prejudice to the public servi-
tude results.7"
9. Where the tidelands have not been freed from the trust, they
68. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 (1970).
69. Id. at 482, 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
70. See Opinion Letter from the Office of the California Att'y General to the
Executive Director, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Comm'n, re:
Request for Opinion on Public Easement for Navigation and Fishing 12-14 (Jan. 29,
1968).
71. Id. at 14.
72. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 n.17, 476 P.2d 423, 437
n.17, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 n.17 (1970); Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199,
207, 282 P.2d 481, 486 (1955).
73. See, e.g., Comment, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Protec-
tion and Development, 55 CAL. L. REv. 728, 772-77 (1967).
74. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 597, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
75. Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 206, 282 P.2d 481, 485 (1955).
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may still be altered or disposed of in a manner consistent with the in-
terests of commerce, the fisheries and navigation. 71 So long as tidelands
remain subject to the trust, however, they may not be alienated into
absolute private ownership; 77 attempted alienation in violation of this
restriction passes only bare title with the tidelands remaining subject to
public easement.78 Conveyances of this nature made after the 1909
statutory bar on the further sale of any and all tidelands are, of course,
void ab initio.79  Where there is evidence that the state has knowingly
allowed tideland owners to erroneously believe that their lands are free
of the trust, the state may be estopped from asserting the continued
existence of the trust as to those lands.80 This is an extraordinary rem-
edy, however, and rarely will be granted.8
10. Where tidelands have been conveyed subject to the trust, the
grantee may use the granted lands as he sees fit, subject to the power of
the state as trustee to abate any nuisance created thereon and to remove
any purpresture erected thereon.82
11. The state's jurisdiction over the tidelands is subservient to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government in matters of commerce, navi-
gation, national defense and international affairs.8 3
III. Trust Enforcement
Enforcement of the tideland trust can be readily divided into two
categories: (1) enforcement by the state to abate interferences with its
management of the trust; and (2) enforcement by private citizens in
their beneficiary capacity when the state has been remiss in its duties as
trustee. Regarding the former, it has already been pointed out that the
state may bring actions to abate nuisances and to remove purprestures
on tidelands not freed from the trust; the Attorney General has ample
authority and standing to sue for these purposes.84 The precise nature
of an actionable misuse of the tidelands has not been clearly defined in
the decisions to date; rather the courts seem to feel that "each case of this
kind [is] to be determined upon its own merits." 8  Generally, how-
76. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 (1970).
77. Id., 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
78. Id., 476 P.2d at 437, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
79. Id. at 482 n.18, 476 P.2d at 437 n.18, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 37 n.18.
80. Id. at 487-501, 476 P.2d at 441-51, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 41-51.
81. See id. at 500, 476 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
82. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 599, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
While a purpresture is not per se a nuisance, the state may still determine that the
"public good" requires its removal. Coburn v. Ames, 52 Cal. 385, 397 (1877).
83. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1964).
84. See, e.g., People v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 234, 240, 50 P. 305,
306 (1897). See also note 82 & accompanying text supra.
85. People v. Southern Pacific R.R., 166 Cal. 614, 620, 138 P. 94, 97 (1913).
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ever, anything which obstructs the free use of the tidelands by the pub-
lic can probably be enjoined by the state.86
Unfortunately, existing California cases on private enforcement of
the tideland trust provide only skeletal guidelines for future litigation.
One of the more illuminating decisions is that of City of Hermosa Beach
v. Superior Court.8 7 In that case the respondent, suing as a private citi-
zen, was seeking an injunction against the erection of fences and against
the construction of a road on a stretch of beach deeded to the city subject
to the condition that it be used as a "public pleasure ground."8' 8 The
city answered by requesting a writ of prohibition against further litiga-
tion on the ground that citizens lacked standing to bring such actions.
In refusing to grant the city's request, the appellate court held that land
dedicated to public use, such as the beach property involved here, could
be "loosely referred to as a public trust"89 and that respondent's stand-
ing as a "resident and taxpayer" sufficiently qualified her to "bring suit
to enforce the duty of a municipality to maintain a park according to
the terms of the dedication." 90
Another pertinent decision is that of Silver v. City of Los Ange-
les,91 in which plaintiff brought an action to have declared void, and
to set aside, an oil and gas lease between defendant City of Los Angeles,
as lessor, and defendant Los Angeles Harbor Oil Company, as lessee.
Significantly, the court recognized that a taxpayer in his representative
capacity could bring an action against a municipality where there was
evidence of "fraud, collusion, ultra vires or a failure on the part of a gov-
vernmental body to perform a duty specifically enjoined."9  However,
since the parties had stipulated that there was no actual fraud, corrup-
tion, bad faith, or undue influence and ultra vires was not pleaded, 93 the
only recourse for the court was to find that a cause of action had not been
adequately stated.
Totally different considerations, however, enter into environmental
litigation. If plaintiffs were to produce evidence that a lease, such as the
one in Silver, constituted deleterious over-development or unsound eco-
management of the trust res, it would seem that an ultra vires act could be
established; under such circumstances the court would clearly be pre-
sented with a justiciable cause of action wholly within the Silver ration-
ale.
In other states there is growing judicial recognition that:
86. See CAr. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-80, 3494.
87. 231 Cal. App. 2d 295, 41 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1964).
88. Id. at 296-97, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
89. Id. at 299, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
90. Id. at 311, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
91. 57 Cal. 2d 39, 366 P.2d 651, 17 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1961).
92. Id. at 40-41, 366 P.2d at 652, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
93. Id.
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self-interested and powerful minorities often have an undue in-
fluence on the public resource decisions of legislative and ad-
ministrative bodies and cause those bodies to ignore broadly
based public interests. 94
Indeed, the courts are gradually beginning to realize that adminis-
trative agencies wield unprecedented power and that these entities do not
necessarily function properly without constant and close scrutiny. Ac-
cordingly, the courts are intervening in the administrative aspects of gov-
ernment with increasing frequency when members of the public seek
judicial review of seemingly arbitrary administrative action perceived
to be contrary to the public interest. 95
As a consequence, other jurisdictions have been receptive to citi-
zens seeking to establish their rights as beneficiaries of public trusts.
Even before the turn of the century, the standing of trust beneficiaries
received judicial approval. In Davenport v. Buffington96 the circuit
court of appeals was dealing with the sale of public park lands to private
interests in violation of an original grant; private citizens were seeking
to bar the sale. The court held for the plaintiffs, stating that:
[T]he enforcement of trusts is one of the great heads of equity
jurisdiction. The land in these parks, if it was really dedicated
to the use of the public for park purposes, is held in trust for
that use, and courts of equity always interfere at the suit of a
cestui que trust or a cestui que use to prohibit a violation of the
trust, or a destruction of the right of user. The appellee . . .
is one of the cestuis que use for whom these parks are held in
trust, and the inevitable conclusion is that his interest in them
is ample to enable him to maintain a suit in equity to prevent
their diversion to private uses. 97
A more recent case is that of Archbold v. McLaughlin,9" where the
plaintiffs sought to have a dedication of land for park purposes specifi-
cally enforced over the objection of officials in the District of Columbia,
who wanted to construct a highway through the area. In denying a
motion by the district officials to dismiss the complaint, the federal dis-
trict court held that:
Land dedicated to the use of the public for park purposes is
held in trust for that use, and a resident of the city or town in
which the park is located may maintain a suit in equity to pre-
94. Sax, supra note 18, at 650.
95. See, e.g., Citizen's Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102
(2d Cir. 1970), where the court found clear evidence of congressional intent for the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act to "assure comprehensive review of 'a broad
spectrum of administrative actions.'" But see McIntire, Necessity in Condemnation
Cases-Who Speaks for the People?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1971).
96. 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899).
97. 97 F. at 236-37.
98. 181 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1960), cited with approval in Allen v. Hickel,
424 F.2d 944, 947 n.5 (D.D.C. 1970).
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vent diversion of the use of such land. .... 99
Michigan has codified the public's right to enforce public trusts in
its Environmental Protection Act of 1970.10 The key provisions of
that statute enable any governmental agency, person or legal entity to
seek equitable relief against any other governmental agency, person or
legal entity when necessary to protect the air, water and other natural
resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or
destruction.10 The act further provides that the plaintiff has made a
prima facie case when he has shown that the defendant has polluted,
or is likely to pollute or to destroy the air, water and other natural re-
sources or the public trust therein.10 2
If Californians have a right to any tideland benefits, it must ulti-
mately flow from the public trust protecting those lands. As evidenced
by the above cases, and in particular by the Michigan statute, private
citizens have a right to enforce public trusts; with their undisputed status
as a trust res, the tidelands certainly should receive similar protection.
IV. The Role of Commercial Growth
in Trust Administration
California decisions dealing with the tideland trust have in the past
evidenced an apparent inflexibility of purpose. A cursory analysis of
the trust terms, for example, indicates that the trust is designed to pro-
mote commerce, the fisheries and navigation and that its terms have
been reduced to a set of fixed and readily enforceable standards. Ac-
tually, nothing could be further from the truth; at the very heart of the
cases is a concern for the "public interest," and that, as indicated in Blun-
dell v. Catterall,103 has never been adequately defined.
Understanding how the courts have interpreted what Justice Frank-
furter called that "vague impalpable but all-controlling consideration,
the public interest! 04 is a prerequisite to understanding how environ-
mental degradation of the coastal zone continued to increase even as
the California courts were ostensibly protecting the public interest in the
tidelands. Interpretation of the public interest has varied both histori-
cally and among jurisdictions; as indicated by Justice Gray in Shively v.
Bowlby, 05 each state has dealt with its tidelands "according to its own
views of justice and policy. . . ."106 In California, justice and policy
have stressed growth and economic expansion.
99. 181 F. Supp. at 180.
100. MicH. CoM,. L ws ANN. §§ 691.1201-691.1207.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
104. F. FRANKmUTER, FELIX FRANKFRTER REMINISCES 72 (1960).
105. 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
106. Id. at 26.
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Early in its history, California formalized a judicial rationale which
transformed the goals of private individuals into public policies. This
is well documented in the history of the state's administrative land
agencies'"1 but is perhaps most strikingly illustrated by judicial deci-
sions interpreting the policies of those agencies. As stated in a recent
report prepared by the legislature:
Since man's main concern from the beginning of California's
development has been the exploitation of resources to develop
the economy, the bulk of the law and the weight of judicial
precedent has tended to favor special interests.1" 8
In other words, since its earliest days, California has felt that
unbridled economic expansion was in the public's best interest. The
courts have enforced the tideland trust accordingly. One particularly
illuminating example of this judicial attitude can be found in Boone v.
Kingsbury.'°9 The dispute there stemmed from the Surveyor-General's
refusal to issue permits to the plaintiffs for oil prospecting in southern
California tidelands. One of the grounds for refusal was the fear that
the contemplated drilling operations would pollute the surrounding
ocean and harm the marine life found there.110 In ordering issuance of
the permit over the Surveyor-General's protest, the court stated:
In fact, the development of mineral resources, of which oil and
gas are among the most important, is the settled policy of state
and nation, and the courts should not hamper this manifest
policy except upon the existence of the most practical and sub-
stantial grounds. 11
An emphasis on economic growth is manifest in the court's rela-
tively unrestricted view regarding harbor appurtenances. The broadest
decision to date is probably Martin v. Smith,11 2 in which the district
court of appeals, without any examination of the tideland trust doc-
trine, refused to permit a referendum to void a city's lease of its tide-
lands for construction of a restaurant, bar, motel, swimming pool, shop-
ping complex and a parking area. In seeming justification the court
unqualifiedly asserted that such a lease was "consistent with the trust
upon which said lands were conveyed to the city and with the require-
ments of commerce and navigation of [the] harbor."'1 3
The court's passing reference in Martin to the city's part in the
transaction is significant because it touches on a further manifestation
107. See, e.g., G. NASH, STATE GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 124-
36, 207-12, 339-58 (1964).
108. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EN-
VIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 18 (1970).
109. 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928).
110. Id. at 168, 273 P. at 806.
111. Id. at 182, 273 P. at 812.
112. 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960).
113. Id. at 578, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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of the state's stress on growth and expansion. Since the 1950s tideland
grants have usually included a provision requiring that the lands granted
be substantially improved within 10 years and that failure to comply
with such provisions would result in reversion of the granted lands to
the state.' 14 It is manifest that provisions such as these constitute un-
warranted pressure on the grantees to actively solicit development even
where environmentally the best use might be no use at all.1 5 The lands
granted to the municipality in Martin were subject to a 10-year develop-
ment proviso,"' and the court's condoning such extensive commercial
development of the tidelands was undoubtedly based in part upon its
awareness of this provision and the city's desire to comply with it.
The pro-consumption reasoning displayed in Boone and Martin
constitutes an open invitation to developers to attempt to obtain per-
mission for all manner of questionable projects. Implicit in these de-
cisions is a judicial attitude that any project which benefits the state's
commerce, the fisheries or navigation is within the purpose of the trust,
regardless of the environmental or ecological toll which might be ex-
acted as a consequence. Such a rationale could conceivably be used to
justify extensive dredging and filling for a lucrative housing subdivision
as long as the developers were careful to include marina facilities in their
master plan, thereby benefitting navigation, however secondarily. The
fallacy in such reasoning is apparent, for the hypothesis ignores the fact
that, as trustee of the tidelands, the state is under a duty to use reason-
able care and skill in preserving the trust res"7 and that ecologically un-
sound practices ought to be prohibited as violative of the trustee's fidu-
ciary duties.
V. Reappraising the "Public Interest"
There is a recognized need for reappraisal of the tideland trust as
a tool for environmental improvement. One authoritative pronounce-
rnent to this effect in California is the 1967 Marine Resources Develop-
ment Act,"" wherein the legislature stated that:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of California
to develop, encourage, and maintain a comprehensive, coor-
dinated State plan for the orderly, long-range conservation and
development of marine and coastal resources which will ensure
their wise multiple use in the total public interest." 9
114. SAN FRANcIsco BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMB'N, supra note
46, at 11.
115. Such provisions were singled out for special criticism in CAuIORIu ASSEM-
BLY SELECT COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 46, at 32.
116. Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 534, § 1, at 1796.
117. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1959).
118. CAL. Gov'T CODE 88 8800-27.
119. Id. at § 8800. Several states have already met this problem with farsighted
legislative enactments. In Florida, for example, before public lands may be sold there
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Certainly the use of the words "conservation and development of marine
and coastal resources," when juxtaposed with "total public interest,"
imparts a concern for more than the promotion of commerce, the fish-
eries and navigation, as well as a disenchantment with past administrative
policies. 12
0
Although the statute has not expressly converted the tideland trust
into an environmental trust, it is indicative of a legislative belief that
commercial development of the tidelands may have proceeded too
far without regard for other, equally important factors. As such it can
be construed as reflecting a legislative intent to adopt a new approach in
management of the tidelands-an approach which adheres to re-
cently acquired ecological insights into the complex web of biological
relationships found in those areas.' 21 It ought, therefore, to provide the
courts with a mandate for protecting the expanding public interest both
in environmental quality and in the recreational, educational and aes-
thetic utilization of the tidelands' 22 by bestowing official sanction on
such nonconsumptive uses as the establishment of reserves for marine-
biological study, wildlife refuges, parks, scenic easements and open
space allocation. 123
Such an interpretation of the Marine Resources and Development
must be a biological survey and an ecological study made of the proposed sale area.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.12(7) (Supp. 1970). If as a result of those studies it appears
that the sale would interfere with conservation of "fish, marine and wildlife or other
natural resources, including beaches and shores, to such an extent as to be contrary to
the public interest" the lands must be withdrawn from sale. Id. § 253.12(4). Ore-
gon's approach is more comprehensive. It has declared its entire ocean shore a
recreation area. ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.615 (1969). All improvements within this
area must be authorized by permit. Id. § 390.640. Permits are granted after the fol-
lowing factors, among others, are considered: The public need for healthful, safe, aesthe-
tic surroundings; the natural, scenic, recreational and other resources in the area; and
the present and prospective need for conservation and development of those resources.
Id. § 390.655(1).
120. Instrumental in bringing about such changes are reports like the 1966 Cal-
ifornia Fish and Wildlife Plan, supra note 11, wherein it was stated that: "We recog-
nize conflicts among different uses of fish and wildlife resources and with other re-
source programs, but we are not willing to accept the view that economic growth and
development should always be permitted precedence over the amenities of life." I
CALIFORNIA FisH AND GAME COMM'N, CALIFORNIA FISH AND WILDLIFE PLAN 20 (1966).
121. See B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 26 (1963).
122. See, e.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 42-43, 465 P.2d 50, 59,
84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970), where the court declares that there is a "clear public
policy in favor of encouraging and expanding" public use of shoreline areas. For a
discussion of this decision, see Comment, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV.
564 (1970).
123. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967), where the Supreme Court, in
discussing the advisability of building a power plant, held that the test to be applied was
whether or not the project was in the public interest, and that the test was not com-
plete without knowledge of the ecological and overall environmental effects of the
project.
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Act would be in consonance with the attitude being adopted in other
jurisdictions. In the recent case of Texas Committee v. United States,'24
for example, the federal district court granted a stay pending appeal to
prevent the Farmer's Home Administration from expending public funds
on a construction project, the environmental effects of which had not
been adequately considered. Failure to take such effects into account
was held to be in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.125 Citing the statutory language in which Congress recognized
the "critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality," 126 the court concluded that it was "hard to imagine a clearer or
stronger mandate to the Courts. 127  Why California should feel any
different about protecting its tidelands is also "hard to imagine."
1 28
The Massachusetts judiciary has similarly, although less emphati-
cally, reevaluated its role in supervising the administration of public
trusts. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Volpe & Co. 2' was based
on the disarmingly simple, but much-ignored fact that even the tradi-
tional servitudes of commerce, the fisheries and navigation require
adherence to sound ecological principles. In Volpe the Massachusetts
Commissioner of Natural Resources had refused to permit the filling-in
of tidal marshland for a development project. Initially his decision was
upheld, but on appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Court the case
was remanded for additional evidence on the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the taking of property. The appellate court, however, conceded
that protecting the fisheries in the area required maintenance of the
ecological balance in the lands sought to be filled. 3 ' By relating the
necessity of preserving the areas's ecology to the traditional servitude
of the fisheries, it was established that filling the tidelands was not in
the public interest. To make this point it was shown that decaying
plants in the marsh released nutrients essential to micro-organisms
which in turn provided the primary source of nutrition for shellfish,
young finfish and assorted species of crustaceans.-Is
VI. Precedents for Reappraisal
Important as the Volpe decision might be for its enlightened eco-
124. 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1303 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 5, 1970).
125. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
126. Id. § 4331(a).
127. 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions at 1304.
128. In Wilderness Soe'y v. Hickel, 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1335
(D.D.C., Apr. 23, 1970), a preliminary injunction was issued, halting construction of an
Alaska oil pipeline because there had been a failure to comply with the requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. V,
1970).
129. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
130. Id. at 106, 108, 206 N.E.2d at 669, 671.
131. Id.
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logical awareness, ultimately it falls short of the mark because, in the
last analysis, it still restricts the public interest in the tideland trust to
the traditional confines of the commerce, fisheries and navigation servi-
tudes. What is needed is authority for interpreting the trust doctrine
to include environmental quality as a consideration having the same
value as these traditional servitudes.
As a basic operating premise for further discussion, it is well to
keep in mind the words of one eminent scholar who, in commenting on
the trust's capacity to change to meet contemporary social needs, noted
that:
The principle that the public has an interest in tidelands and
banks of navigable waters and a right to use them for purposes
for which there is a substantial public demand may be derived
from the fact that the public won a right to passage over the
shore for access to the sea for fishing when this was the area
of substantial public demand. As time goes by, opportunities
for much more extensive uses of these lands become available
to the public. The assertion by the public of a right to enjoy
additional uses is met by the assertion that the public right is
defined and limited by precedent based upon past uses and
past demand. But such a limitation confuses the application
of the principle under given circumstances with the principle
itself.
The law regarding the public use of property held in part
for the benefit of the public must change as the public need
changes. The words of Justice Cardozo, expressed in a differ-
ent context nearly a half-century ago, are relevant today in our
application of this law: "We may not suffer it to petrify at the
cost of its animating principle."'132
Fortunately, there is some authority in California for the proposi-
tion that if a public trust is to remain relevant, its interpretation must
reflect contemporary social needs. In Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. De-
partment of Public Works'13 the California Supreme Court redefined the
public servitude over navigable waters to meet the state's present require-
ments. The plaintiffs in Colberg were the owners of a shipyard located
on a navigable branch of a tidal channel which ultimately connected their
yard with the Pacific Ocean. They brought their action after the State
Department of Public Works announced plans to construct a low-eleva-
tion freeway bridge across the primary channel leading to the ocean. Al-
though the bridge would put the plaintiffs out of business by preventing
ships from passing the remainder of the distance to plaintiffs shipyard,
the court denied the plaintiffs any compensation and ruled that the
construction of a vehicular bridge over navigable water was within the
totality of a modern-day state's jurisdiction over navigable waters.
132. Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to
Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 202 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
133. 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
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After explaining that the public trust governing navigable waterways
and the lands lying beneath them has always been interpreted liberally
to benefit the public as a whole,"3 4 the court concluded that:
[T]he law of California burdens property riparian or littoral to
navigable waters with a servitude commensurate with the
power of the state over such navigable waters ...
The limitation of the servitude to cases involving a strict
navigational purpose stems from a time when the sole use of
navigable waterways for purposes of commerce was that of
surface water transport. That time is no longer with us. The
demands of modem commerce, the concentration of population
in urban centers fronting on navigable waterways, the achieve-
ments of science in devising new methods of commercial in-
tercourse-all these factors require that the state, in determining
the means by which the general welfare is best to be served
through the utilization of navigable waters held in trust for the
public, should not be burdened with an outmoded classifica-
tion. ... .135
That tideland trust management merits such a flexible approach is
amply buttressed by decisions in other jurisdictions. In Diana Shooting
Club v. Husting,36 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that:
The wisdom of the policy which, in the organic laws of our
state, steadfastly and carefully preserved to the people the full
and free use of public waters, cannot be questioned. Nor
should it be limited or curtailed by narrow constructions. It
should be interpreted in the broad and beneficient spirit that
gave rise to it in order that the people may fully enjoy the in-
tended benefits. . . . They should be free to all for com-
merce, for travel, for recreation, and also for hunting and fish-
ing, which are now mainly certain forms of recreation. Only
by so construing the provision of our organic laws can the
people reap the full benefit of the grant secured to them
therein. This grant was made to them before the state had any
title to convey to private parties, and it became a trustee of the
people charged with the faithful execution of the trust created
for their benefit.137
The Massachusetts case of Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stod-
dard" "3 also merits some attention. That case concerned the public
right to cut ice from water ponds, as affected by a 1641 Massachusetts
charter that preserved the public right to go "fishing and fowling" in
such waters. In ruling that current public needs required an expansion
134. Id. at 417, 432 P.2d at 9, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
135. Id. at 420-23, 432 P.2d at 11-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10. In Miramar
Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 175, 143 P.2d 1, 3 (1943), the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court also ruled that the public servitude over navigable waters con-
templated pleasure boats as well as commercial vessels.
136. 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
137. Id. at 271-72, 145 N.W. at 820.
138. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158 (1863).
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of the original purpose of the charter, the court held that:
With the growth of the community, and its progress in the
arts, these public reservations, at first set apart with refer-
ence to certain special uses only, become capable of many
others which are within the design and intent of the original
appropriation. The devotion to public use is sufficiently broad
to include them all, as they arise. 139
The recent decision in Hayes v. Bowman 4 ' by the Florida Supreme
Court puts the matter quite succinctly:
[T]his title is held in trust for the people for the purposes of
navigation, fishing, bathing and similar uses. Such title is not
held primarily for purposes of sale or conversion into money.
Basically, it is trust property and should be devoted to the ful-
fillment of the purposes of the trust, towit: the service of the
people.141
The decision which goes furthest towards discouraging blind sub-
servience to the traditional servitudes of commerce, the fisheries and
navigation, however, is the recent ruling in Zabel v. Tabb'4 2 where, for
ecological reasons alone, the Corps of Engineers refused to grant plain-
tiffs a permit for dredging and filling certain tidelands on Boca Ciega
Bay in Florida. The Corp's refusal represented a significant departure
from past Corps policy because, by its own admission, the blocked
project was to have no detrimental effect on navigation.'43 In uphold-
ing the Corp's decision, the circuit court of appeals ruled that the gov-
ernment was "entitled, if not required, to consider ecological factors
and, being persuaded by them, to deny that which might have been
granted routinely five, ten, or fifteen years ago."' 44  Clearly the court
was assigning a value to ecological considerations that was meant seri-
ously to contend for some of the weight and prestige given to the tradi-
tional servitudes governing tideland use. In doing so, it openly did what
courts have been doing gradually and indirectly for years: freeing them-
selves from the straightjacket of illogically having to force the broad
139. Id. at 167.
140. 91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957).
141. Id. at 799.
142. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
143. The court's opinion is somewhat restricted in its innovative character by the
fact that the Corps was basing its action on the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 661, 662(a) (1964), which required the Secretary of the Army to consult
with the Fish and Wildlife Service and state conservation agencies before issuing a
permit to dredge and fill to determine whether the alterations would damage wildlife
resources; such consultation had been undertaken, and they were also opposed to the
project. 430 F.2d at 202. See also 33 C.F.R. 209.120(d) (1) (1970), which provides
that the Corps, in considering an application for a permit to fill, dredge, discharge or
deposit materials, or conduct other activities affecting navigable water, will evaluate "all
relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish and
wildlife, conservation, pollution, esthetics, ecology, and the general public interest."
144. 430 F.2d at 201 (1970).
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idea of the public interest into the narrow molds provided by the servi-
tudes of "commerce," "the fisheries" and "navigation."'-45  The test
adopted in Zabel was clearly whether the proposal served the broad pub-
lic interest, including concerns for environmental quality. Anything
which ignored the ecological integrity of the area could not be con-
doned.
VII. The Public Interest in Environmental Quality
The tidelands of California are seriously threatened by the nature
of past land use practices. Those practices have been characterized as
being both "helter-skelter"' " and often the precursor of "environmen-
tal crisis."'14 7 If freed from its traditional role as the promoter of com-
merce, the fisheries and navigation, the tideland trust could become an
effective tool for bringing about necessary changes. Persuasive and
authoritative precedent exists for incorporating new social needs into
California's public trust management as those needs arise. Their ap-
plication to broaden the scope of the tideland trust, however, is contin-
gent on the state's judiciary recognizing that the continuation of past
development practices in the tidelands is in direct contravention of a
clear public interest in restoration of environmental quality.
This new public interest finds expression in practically all social
spheres, obviating the necessity of dwelling on it at great length here.
The Federal Government, for example, has enunciated a national policy
that environmental considerations be given independent status as a crucial
step in the decision-making process.' 4 s The President reiterated this
policy when he ordered that in the future:
Federal agencies shall initiate measures needed to direct their
policies, plans and programs so as to meet national environ-
mental goals.' 49
He has also stated that:
Like those in the last century who tilled a plot of land to ex-
haustion and then moved on to another, we in this century have
too casually and too long abused our natural environment.
The time has come when we can wait no longer to repair the
damage already done, and to establish new criteria to guide
us in the future.' 50
In addition to these policy statements, events on the tactical level
also evince concern for the environment throughout a broad social spec-
145. See text accompanying notes 136-41 supra.
146. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
147. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
148. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (1970).
149. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg; 4247 (1970).
150. Message by President Nixon to Congress on the Environment, Feb. 10, 1970,
[19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 112.
February 19711 CALIFORNIA'S TIDELAND TRUST
trum. Numerous federal laws have been passed to protect the public
from any further environmental deterioration,'15 and the states have
followed suit.152 Sundry governmental agencies have been created to
serve as watchdogs in this area.153 Additionally, there has been a sharp
increase in environmental suits by citizen groups seeking to fill in the
gaps when laws and agencies have fallen short of public aspirations.' 54
It is always more difficult to add a new category to the list of needs
said to make up the public interest than it is to argue that a recognized
subject of public concern should be interpreted more liberally.' 55 To
be successful in broadening the scope of "public interest" one must act
from an extremely broad base of popular support and that often re-
quires a national emergency or disaster.'56 In the battle against further
environmental deterioration there appears to be just such a situation if
the multitude of legislative, judicial and scholarly comment to that ef-
fect is to be given any weight. Possibly, however, the urgency of the
situation is best summarized in the following words:
This task is ours together. It summons our energy, our ingenuity
and our conscience in a cause as fundamental as life itself.' 5 7
There appears to be no problem in finding authority for the general
proposition that "eco-management"' 5 has arrived as a guiding princi-
ple in land management to replace the older one of "expediency. '
Making an exception for the management of California's tidelands sim-
ply cannot be justified. Indeed, the extent to which the contrary is true
has been concisely stated in a recent report made to the legislature
wherein it was noted that:
Protection of the coastal zone of California is a high pri-
151. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75
(1970).
152. See, e.g., Williamson Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-95, which offers tax
incentives to landowners who agree to leave their land in open space uses.
153. In 1968 the California Environmental Study Council was created for the
purpose of inquiring into the condition of the state's physical environment. It is author-
ized to hold hearings and to make environmental studies, reports and recommenda-
tions. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16000-81.
154. Cases of this sort are constantly appearing in the various reporters. Any
attempt at listing them here would be both futile and misleading. The present major
decisions in this area of the law are discussed in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 102-08
(Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1970).
155. Braybrook, The Public Interest: The Present and Future of the Concept,
in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 129, 151 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
156. See Friedmann, The Changing Content of Public Interest, in THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 80, 85 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
157. Message by President Nixon to Congress on the environment, supra note
150, at 123.
158. See, e.g., Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public Land Policy, 10
NAT. RES. L.J. 203 (1970).
159. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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ority need. Here . . . the major alterations to California's
land and water environment are taking place.
Within the coastal zone, there is a variety of scarce en-
vironments, such as bays, estuaries and lagoons with fish, wild-
life and other resources which are dependent on such habitat.
These areas plus the beaches and adjoining lands are often
the last remaining natural and scenic spots amid urban sprawl.
These irreplaceable environmental values are threatened
only briefly, for once the planned developments materialize
the threat is over. In its stead are irreversible changes. Imme-
diate action must be taken to prevent the destruction of these
environmental values.1 °
Responding adequately to this and to similar legislative mandates
will be one of the more challenging tasks for California courts in the
future. As the state's population continues to expand rapidly, devel-
opers will continue to exert increasing pressures on California's tidelands.
What the courts ultimately do to alleviate these pressures will be de-
termined by how restrictively they view the public interest under the
tidelands trust.
VIII. Conclusion
There is no fixed argument guaranteed to halt any and every pro-
posed tideland project; indeed, some future projects will inevitably be
necessary and good. There is, however, need of a new approach which
will put proposed projects into proper perspective. Even though the
traditional trust concern for commerce, the fisheries and navigation has
undeniable importance in the wise utilization of California's tidelands,
other considerations have now assumed positions of peculiar promi-
nence. Stated categorically, the ecological integrity of the tidelands is
seriously threatened; the state as trustee of those lands should be most
vigilant.
What is required first is a revitalization of the tidelands trust.
The utilization of California's tidelands has, for too long, been based on
legal, economic and political considerations which have almost totally
ignored the ecological context in which those lands are found. Environ-
mental advocates will undoubtedly attempt to expand the scope of the
trust on the basis of the recent legislative and judicial acknowledgement
of the importance of ecological principles. If the courts listen, the leg-
acy of the state's past need not be accepted as the pattern for the future.
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